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APPLICABILITY OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAWS
TO EVENTS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Jordan J. Paust"
INTRODUCTION
An analysis of the applicability of international criminal laws to
events in the former Yugoslavia, and more specifically in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, should begin with the recognition that there are two basic
categories of international criminal law which serve as bases for delin-
eating individual responsibility. First, various multilateral treaties form a
basic framework of recognized legal standards and a basis for criminal
sanctions. Second, several norms of customary international law, many
of which are interrelated, provide another basis for standards and sanc-
tions.
I. TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
The former Yugoslavia was a signatory to several relevant treaties,
including the United Nations Charter;' the 1948 Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Conven-
tion);2 the 1949 Geneva Conventions3 and the 1977 Protocols4 thereto;
* Professor of Law, University of Houston. After this paper was delivered at
the April 3. 1993 regional meeting of the American Society of International Law
(ASIL) and The American University's Washington College of Law International
Workshop, I became an Advocate and Counsel for Bosnia-Herzegovina in its case
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). I am indebted to Professor Francis
Boyle of the University of Illinois, who was a Co-Agent for Bosnia-Herzegovina and
lead counsel before the ICJ, and to various members of the Applicant's legal team
for several media citations in footnote 32. Some citations in footnotes 60 and 62 are
also a product of team efforts.
1. U.N. CHARTER, June 26. 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1153.
2. Convention on the -Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. Genocidal strategies
and complicitious involvement aimed at genocide can also implicate the International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. See G.A.
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the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR); the 1984
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention);6 and the 1989 Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child! Treaty law binds the nationals of a
signatory state, regardless of a person's economic, social, political, or
official position. Furthermore, under generally accepted principles of
international law, the new states or entities which emerge from the for-
mer Yugoslavia, as well as the participants in these processes, remain
Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974)
(ratified by the former Yugoslavia).
3. Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 3 (1950) [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions]. Four multilateral agreements comprise the 1949 Geneva Conventions: Gene-
va Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (1950);
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 (1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (1950); Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1950) [hereinafter Geneva Civilian Convention].
4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Civilian Convention, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977), 1977 U.N.
Jurid. Y.B. 95, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977), 1977 U.N.
Jurid. Y.B. 135, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter CCPR].
6. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197,
U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1984172/Annex (1984), reprifited in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [herein-
after Torture Convention].
7. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., 61st mtg., Annex (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1457 (1993). This treaty is
also applicable in the context of war. See Cynthia Price Cohen, Remarks, in CONTEM-
PORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IssuEs: SHARING PAN-EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PER-
SPECTIVES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE HELD IN THE HAGUE, THE
NETHERLANDS, JULY 4-6, 1991, at 177-78 (Dean C. Alexander ed., 1992) (panel on
Humanitarian Law and the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis) (discussing the effect of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child on the rights of children affected by the Iraq-Kuwait
conflict). Cohen notes that the convention extends the rights of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Protocols I and II to children. Id. at 177. Moreover, these "civil-
political rights" are generally absolute under the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Id. at 178.
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bound to observe Yugoslavia's multilateral treaty commitments. This
obligation will continue to persist until a new government expresses a
formal and otherwise permissible claim to the contrary.8 Under the 1949
Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols, a country's refusal to
8. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, arts.
34, 35, U.N. Doc. A/CONF./80/31, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1488, 1509 (1978) (discuss-
ing the succession of states to treaties of the former state, whether or not the prede-
cessor State continues to exist). Both articles specify that existing treaty obligations
apply to the new, or newly independent state, unless the "states concerned" agree
otherwise. Id. arts. 34-35. See also Detlev F. Vagts, State Succession: The Codifiers'
View, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 289-94 (1993) (discussing state succession to various
types of international treaties and agreements). Especially obligatory are treaties which
purport to espouse "general principles of international law." Id. at 289. Among these
treaties are the Genocide Convention and the CCPR. See sources cited supra notes 2,
5; Vagts, supra, at 290 (noting that these treaties represent international commitments
that many consider binding on States as a part of customary international law). See
also Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Pro-
cess: The Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 9 & n.28 (1978)
(memorandum for the new State of Bangladesh also discussing the relationship be-
tween international law and the State of Bangladesh). Specifically, the article notes
that the new State of Bangladesh, under generally accepted principles of international
law, should be obligated to honor Pakistan's treaty commitments concerning the laws
of war, genocide, and human rights, until a formal and permissible claim of contrary
obligations is asserted by Bangladesh. Id. at 9.
Of the successor states to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina have formally declared successions to obligations assumed by the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See Case Concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzeg6vina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 15 para. 22 (April
8), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 888, 896 (1993) [hereinafter Prevention of Genocide case].
One declaration stated that the Federal Republic would "strictly abide by all the com-
mitments that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed internationally."
32 I.L.M. at 896 para. 22 (quoting a formal declaration adopted by the Federal Re-
public on Apr. 27, 1992). Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its formal succession to the
Genocide Convention on Dec. 29, 1992. Id. at 896 para. 23. This succession notice
retroactively affirmed Bosnia-Herzegovina's succession to the Genocide Convention
from March 6, 1992, when Bosnia-Herzegovina became independent. Id. Additionally,
Bosnia-Herzergovina has formally succeeded to the Vienna Convention on Succession
of States in Respect of Treaties. See Letter from Dr. Haris SilajdNi6, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to H.E. Boutros Ghali, U.N.
Secretary-General (July 8, 1993) (on file with The American University Journal of
International Law and Policy) (expressing that the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina "considers itself bound by the Vienna Convention on Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties").
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accept a treaty obligation will not take effect while hostilities are ongo-
ing,9 and then, not for certain periods thereafter."0
Each of the aforementioned treaties is of a recognizably higher status
than ordinary international agreements. The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in 1970 affirmed that certain obligations under international law
"are the concern of all States . . . [and i]n view of the importance of
the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in
their protection."" These duties include prohibitions of outlawed acts of
aggression, genocide, and the deprivation of fundamental individual hu-
man rights. 2 War crimes, as covered by Geneva law, should also be
9. See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3, arts. 6. 158, 6 U.S.T. at
3522, 3623, 75 U.N.T.S. at 292, 392; Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 3(b), 99; Proto-
col II, supra note 4, arts. 2(2), 25.
10. See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3, arts. 6, 158, 6 U.S.T. at
3522, 3623, 75 U.N.T.S. at 292, 392; Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 3(b), 99; Proto-
col II, supra note 4, arts. 2(2), 25.
11. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5), quoted in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 703 reporters' note 3 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] (distinguishing between obligations of a state toward the general inter-
national community and those obligations with respect to a specific state involving
diplomatic protection). The ICJ noted that the former obligations are of greater prima-
cy in the international system and are obligatio erga omnes. Id. at 32.
12. Id. Also significant with respect to the higher status and erga omnes nature
of several such treaties is the fact that neither termination nor suspension of perfor-
mance is available for treaty provisions relating to protection of basic human rights,
such as the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the subsequent Protocols.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 60(5), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF./39127, at 289 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 701 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties] (expressly protecting human rights provisions
from unilateral termination due to a material breach of a treaty by another Party to
the treaty); Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3, arts. 27, 33, 148 (forbidding,
in all cases, certain treatment of protected persons, collective punishment of protected
persons, reprisals, and attempts to absolve oneself or another Party of liability); see
also Paust & Blaustein, supra note 8, at 33-34 (observing that a breach of a human
rights provision of a given treaty by one Party does not justify a counter-breach by
another Party to the treaty).
Specifically regarding genocide, Judge Elihu Lauterpacht of the ICJ has added
that "[tihe duty to 'prevent' genocide ... rests upon all parties" and is furthermore a
duty which all parties owe to each other. See Case Concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Further Requests for the Indication of Provision-
al Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 325 para. 86 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter I.C.J. Second Request]
(separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
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included among a state's erga omnes duties, especially' in view of com-
mon Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, 3 and the universally obliga-
tory criminal sanction provisions. 4 As these obligations are of a higher,
universal nature, it would be inappropriate to adopt more ordinary and
formalistic rules concerning the succession of new states to these trea-
ties.
To date, there have been no formal attempts to denounce either the
succession to or the general application of such treaties. They remain
binding on nationals of the former Yugoslavia with respect to illegal
uses of force, genocide, violations of Geneva law, and to human rights
protected therein and under various other treaties. The same analysis
applies with respect to other obligations under the U.N. Charter which,
in view of Article 103, also retain a higher status over ordinary treaty
obligations. 5 In its interim report in January 1993, the Commission of
Experts, established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, af-
firmed that each of the Republics in the former Yugoslavia was bound
by the constraints of the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions as
well as by other agreements. 6
13. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3, art. I (which requires all signa-
tories "to respect and to ensure respect for the Convention[s] in all circumstances").
14. See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3. arts. 1, 146-47; Paust &
Blaustein, supra note 8, at 9 & n.30, 27-29; Jordan J. Paust, Universality and the
Responsibility to Enforce International Criminal Law: No U.S. Sanctuary for Alleged
Nazi War Criminals, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 337, 337-40 (1989) [hereinafter Paust, No
U.S. Sanctuary]; Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. S.C. Doe. S/25704, at 9 para. 35 (1993), re-
printed in 32 I.L.M. 1163 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary General] (stating
that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, genocide, and other crimes against
humanity are undoubtedly a part of customary international law). The U.N. Security
Council approved the report. U.N. S.C. Res. 827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203,
1204 (1993).
15. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter reads: "In the event of a conflict between
the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevail." U.N. CHARTER, supra note 1, art. 103.
Judge Lauterpacht of the ICJ rightly adds, however, that jus cogens norms will
trump Article 103. See I.C.J. Second Request, supra note 12, para. 100 (separate
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht). Most assuredly, this follows from the fact that custom-
ary jus cogens will trump any treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 12, arts. 53, 64. Yet, several jus cogens norms are reflected in the U.N.
Charter. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 702(a).
16. See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), at 13 para. 38, in Letter Dated 9 February
1994]
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II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Customary international law binds all nations,'7 as well as nationals
of former states.'8 Today, such customary law includes the prohibition
of genocide, war crimes, criminal sanction responsibilities recognized un-
der the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and many of the basic rights of the
human person evidenced in the CCPR, including several due process
guarantees for the accused. 9 Thus, regardless of whether or not norms
1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. S.C. Doc. S/25274 (1993), Annex [hereinafter Commission Report I]. The Feder-
al Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) expressly and formally declared
that it "shall strictly abide by all the commitments" of the former Yugoslavia. Pre-
vention of Genocide case, supra note 8, at 896 para. 22. The Commission of Experts
adds with respect to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1954 Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, that each of
the "parties to the successive armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have conclud-
ed a series of . . .special agreements ...to bring into force ...all or part of the
provisions of these conventions," including the obligations to halt violations and initi-
ate prosecution of those accused of violations. See Commission Report I, supra, at 14
para. 43. Of course, such special agreements may set a minimum, but they are not
determinative of applicability more generally. See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention,
supra note 3, arts. 1, 3, 7, 8, 148.
17. Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status
as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 64-67 & n.14 (1990) [herein-
after Paust, Customary International Law]. See also Commission Report I, supra note
16, at 13-14 para. 40; 15 paras. 46, 49-50; 20 para. 72.
18. See, e.g., Paust & Blaustein, supra note 8, at 10; RESTATEMENT, supra note
11, § 210.
19. See, e.g., CCPR, supra note 5; Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 75 (concerning
due process guarantees for the accused); Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 6; Jordan J.
Paust, Gerhard von Glahn & Gunter Woratsch, Report of the ICJ Mission of Inquiry
Into the Israeli Military Court System in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza, 14
HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 17-61, 65-66 (1990); Paust & Blaustein, supra note
8, at 31-33. In my opinion, trials in absentia would ,iolate such rights of the ac-
cused, but an indictment in absentia, with adequate court-appointed or other counsel,
may not. The International Tribunal will not have trials in absentia. See, e.g., U.N.
S.C. Res. 827 (1993), para. 2, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203, 1204 (1993) (establishing
a tribunal and adopting the Statute annexed to the Report of the Secretary General);
Report of the Secretary General, supra note 14, at 25 para. 101. The Secretary
General's Report also recognized that "[tihe part of conventional international humani-
tarian law which has beyond doubt become part of international customary law is the
law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in: the Geneva Conventions ... the
Hague Convention (IV) . . . the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide ... and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8
August 1945," i.e., the Nuremberg Charter (which includes "Crimes Against Humani-
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expressed in multilateral treaties retain their applicability through their
bases in treaty law, several remain applicable as customary international
law and, indeed, as customary obligatio erga omnes.
Additionally, the prohibition of genocide is a well-recognized example
of a peremptory norm jus cogens.2" Other peremptory norms include
violations of fundamental human rights in times of either armed conflict
or relative peace." Thus, jus cogens norms reflected in Geneva law
and the 1966 Covenant similarly apply.22 In addition, one should recog-
nize that the U.N. Charter, the Genocide Convention, the CCPR, the
1984 Convention Against Torture, and the 1989 Convention on the
Rights of the Child also apply in all circumstances of social violence or
relative peace, with the possible exception of permissible derogations'
under the CCPR,24 and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the
Child.2
ty"). Report of the Secretary General, supra note 14, para. 35; see also id. paras. 37,
41-42, 44, 45, 47-48 (otherwise erroneously stating that "Crimes against Humanity
were first recognized" in the Nuremberg Charter).
20. See, e.g., I.C.J. Second Request, supra note 12, para. 100 (separate opinion
of Judge Lauterpacht); RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 702(a) cmts. d, n; Jordan J.
Paust, Congress and Genocide: They're Not Going to Get Away With It, 11 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 90, 92-94 & n.3 (1989) [hereinafter Paust, Congress and Genocide].
21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 702 cmt. n, reporters' note 1; In
re Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992), quoting Siderman de Blake
v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that inter-
national prohibition against official torture has "the force of a jus cogens norm"); see
generally Jordan J. Paust, The Reality of Jus Cogens, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 81 (1991).
The customary jus cogens prohibitions recognized by the Restatement include: geno-
cide; slavery or slave trade; the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals;
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged
arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination; and a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11.
22. See Commission Report I, supra note 16, at 15 para. 46 ("applicability" of
fundamental human rights norms and the prohibition of genocide is further assured by
"their character as peremptory norms of international law").
23. Derogations are not permitted with respect to all articles and are limited. For
example, derogations are limited in the CCPR to times of "public emergency" which
threaten the life of the nation, when officially proclaimed, and by the necessity stan-
dard contained in the phrase "to the extent strictly required" as well as by the ex-
press proviso "that such measures are not inconsistent with ... other obligations un-
der international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race,
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin." CCPR, supra note 5, art. 4(2).
24. CCPR, supra note 5, arts. 4-5; see also id. arts. 12(3), 13, 18(3), 19(3), 21,
22(2).
25. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, arts. 5, 10(2), 13(2),
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Geneva law, however, is limited to circumstances of armed conflict.
These involve either an Article 2 conflict of an international character,
or an Article 3 conflict which is not international in character. The
customary laws of war which are not reflected in common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions, and Protocol II thereto, are also applicable in
times of armed conflict. These customary laws, however, are recogniz-
ably limited to circumstances of war involving states or nations, and to
so-called "true" civil wars which attain the status of a "belligerency."
The latter exemplifies one such situation which does not depend upon
statehood status for both participants. An example of this type of situa-
tion is the United States Civil War.26
III. THE ARMED CONFLICT IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
With respect to the armed conflict occurring in the former Yugoslavia,
at a minimum, common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions should
clearly apply. Accordingly, Protocol II also would apply. Even with a
severely restricted focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the fighting within
such territory, Bosnian-Serb and Muslim combatants generally meet
recognized criteria, at least minimally, for insurgent status. These in-
clude: (1) sustained use of force; (2) an armed force with a responsible
command structure; (3) general control of significant territory; and (4)
the semblance of a governmental structure, especially one negotiating at
the international level.2'
In addition, the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict certainly qualifies as an
international armed conflict meeting several criteria. First, it is evident
that within Bosnia-Herzegovina proper, there exists a "belligerency," or
true civil war, with outside de facto, if not also de jure, recognition of
local participants as civil war belligerents. Having attained the status of
14(3), 15(2).
26. See, e.g., Paust & Blaustein, supra note 8, at I1 & n.38, 13 & nn.43-45, 14
(noting that once a conflict has transformed from an insurgency into a belligerency,
the bulk of the Geneva Conventions apply to the conflict); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY. FM
27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 9 para. 11(a) (1956) [hereinafter LAND WAR-
FARE] (applying the customary law of war to civil war when rebels become recog-
nized as belligerents).
27. See, e.g., Paust & Blaustein, supra note 8, at 12 (describing the insurgent
status of the forces of Bangladesh during the conflict with Pakistan); JEAN S. PIcTET,
COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 31, 34-37; see also Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 1(1)
(discussing the situations under which Protocol II applies).
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a "belligerency," common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions along
with all of the general proscriptions and Protocol I thereto applies, in
addition to the more general customary law of war.28 Second, outside
intervention in several forms by neighboring nations has definitely inter-
nationalized the conflict.29 It cannot be reasonably characterized as a
local insurgency. Third, it is arguable that United Nations intervention in
the form of recognizing and condemnatory resolutions, and authoriza-
tions for certain forceful measures, has further internationalized the con-
flict to such an extent that the Geneva common Article 2 threshold has
been reached.
Resolutions of the U.N. Security Council have specifically recognized
the existence of an armed conflict in the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina" and the presence of both military and paramilitary forces
engaging in hostilities.3' The U.N. Security Council has further noted
outside intervention by other military forces, in particular, the participa-
28. See, e.g., Paust & Blaustein, supra note 8, at 11 & n.38, 12-14; Protocol I,
supra note 4, arts. 1(4), 96(3) (noting applicability of Protocol I); PIcmT, supra note
27, at 118-19 (pointing out that Part II of the Geneva Convention also applies to
"belligerents' own nationals"). It would not be policy-serving to argue that although
the customary laws of war apply to a belligerency, the common Article 2 threshold
of Geneva law does not, especially when many of the Geneva norms are now cus-
tomary. See Commission Report I, supra note 16, at 14 para. 40 (noting that the
Commission of Experts also recognizes that "rules of customary international law may
be found in the Geneva Conventions"). Although the treaty should expressly recognize
such a clear cutback of coverage in its text, it fails to do so. See Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 31(3)(c) (customary international law is a
presumptive background for the interpretation of any treaty and thus the Geneva Con-
ventions).
29. Paust & Blaustein, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that a conflict with interna-
tional impact triggers Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions).
30. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 787
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1481, 1483 (1992); U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th
mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 771 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1470-71 (1992); U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3093d mtg., at 3, U.N. S.C. Res. 764 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 1465-67 (1992).
31. See. e.g., U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 787
(1992); U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 780 (1992); U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess. 3118th mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 779 (1992); U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3106th mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 771 (1992) (expressing concern with the re-
ports of gross international humanitarian law violations which occurred within the ter-
ritory of the former Yugoslavia and with particular concern over the occurrences in
Bosnia and Herzegovina which included deliberate attacks on hospitals, ambulances
and other non-combatants).
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tion by "elements of the Croatian army,"32 the Federal Republic of
32. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 787
(1992) (requiring the immediate cessation and withdrawal of all forms of outside
interference including action taken by units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and
elements of the Croatian Army); see also I.C.J. Second Request, supra note 12, paras.
54-62, 67 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) (referring to the Yugoslav interven-
tion' and additionally addressing reports of statements by U.S. Ambassador Madeleine
Albright, European Community Mediator Lord Owen, and U.S. Senator Joe Biden (D.-
Del.)); see generally U.N. G.A. Res. 47/121 (1992) (pointing out the failure to stop
either the direct or indirect support by the JNA's aggressive acts); U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-2/6, at 3 (1992) (condemning ethnic
cleansing being carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina and recognizing that, among
others, "the Yugoslav Army" bears "primary responsibility"), quoted in Payam
Akhavan, Punishing War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: A Critical Juncture for
the New World Order, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 262, 267 (1993); Second Interim Report of
the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780
(1992), in Letter Dated 5 October 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. S.C. Doc. S/26545/Annex, at 16 para. 68
(1993) (determining that alleged perpetrators of rape include special forces, consisting
of some individuals from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina) [hereinafter Commission
Report II]; John Darnton, Croatia Forced to Admit That Its Army Is in Bosnia, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1994, at A4 (noting that thousands of Croatian regular troops have
frequently crossed the porous border into Bosnia); Paul Lewis, U.S. Official Visits
Graves in Croatia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1994, at A3 (citing that thousands of Croatian
soldiers and dozens of tanks were sent into Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Zagreb Gov-
ernment); David Binder, C.LA. Doubtful on Serbian Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
1993, at A3 (reporting that the Serbian Government supplied the Serbian forces which
took control of over two-thirds of Bosnia); Tony Barber, Muslim Numbers Make Up
for Forces Lack of Weapons, INDEPENDENT, June 24, 1993, at 10 (providing a state-
ment by military specialist James Gow that JNA soldiers reinforced Bosnian Serbs
and assisted with helicopter missions); Louise Branson & Bosanska Raca, Golden
Highway Makes a Joke of Bosnian Blockade, SUNDAY TIMES, May 23, 1993 (Over-
seas News); Marcus Tanner, Serbs to 'Examine' Plan for Border Observers, INDEPEN-
DENT, May 19, 1993, at 12 (reporting that trucks and petrol tankers continue to cross
the border from Serbia to Bosnia in defiance of the blockade); David B. Ottaway,
Serbia's Cross-Border Embargo Far from Airtight: Fuel Tankers Roll Into Nationalist-
Held Bosnia, WASH. POST, May 13, 1993, at A18; Stephen Kinzer, Conflict in the
Balkans: 2 Major Mosques Blown up by Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1993, § 1, at 1
(reporting the official declaration by the Yugoslav and Serbian Governments of their
futuire intent to cut off all military and logistical support given to Bosnian Serbs);
NATO Reports Violations of Bosnian No-Fly Zone, Reuter Lib. Rep., May 1, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File 3 (recounting the capture of two
military helicopters from Serbia which were violating the no-fly zone over the former
Yugoslav Republic); Laura Silber, Mladic Scorns Western Threats, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
16, 1993, at 2 (reporting on Serbian President Milosevic's selection of General Mladic
to oversee the war in Bosnia); Roger Cohen, Yugoslavia Role in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES,
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Mar. 22, 1993, at 6 (observing the well-coordinated efforts of the military operation
by Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb forces in the Srebrenica area); Carol J. Williams, Serb
Attack in Krajina May Renew All-Out War, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 28, 1993, at A13
(reasoning that the Serbian attack on southern Croatia was in retaliation for offensive
measures by the Croatian Government); Chuck Sudetic, Serbs Attack Muslim Slavs
and Croats in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1992, at 13 (noting the irregulars and the
JNA fighting in Bosnia); Chuck Sudetic, Croat Towns Bombed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1992, at A10 (recounting the JNA airstrikes on
towns in Bosnia); John F. Bums, Pessimism Is Overshadowing Hope in Effort to End
Yugoslav Fighting, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at Al (reporting on the JNA units
and equipment transfer to Bosnian Serb units); Chuck Sudetic, Serbian Gunners Pound
Sarajevo, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1992, at II (counting over 80,000 Yugoslavian sol-
diers joining the Serb Army when Yugoslavia withdrew from the Republic); James C.
O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations on hternational Humanitarian Law
in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J.-INT'L L. 639, 647 (1993) (reporting "a number
of fronts and partisan or proxy groups participating on behalf of each other"); Dr.
Milan Vego, Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4 JANE'S INTEL-
LIGENCE REv. 445 (Oct. 1992) (relating that the Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of
Serbia and Montenegro) exercises operational command-and-control over JNA forces
and other Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina); Mark Weller, The International
Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 569, 593, 602 (1992) (noting that JNA units as well as elements of the
Croatian Army are involved in the fighting occurring in Bosnia-Herzegovina); Exec.
Order No. 12,808, 3 C.F.R. 305 (1992) (quoting a statement by then-U.S. President
George Bush that "the actions and policies of the Governments of Serbia and
Montenegro, acting under the name . . . Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in their
involvement in and support for . . . force and violence utilizing, in part, the forces of
the so-called Yugoslav National Army") (emphasis added), reprinted in Marian Nash.
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 595, 614-15 (1993). President Clinton stated that
[b]ecause the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) has continued its actions and policies in support of
groups seizing and attempting to seize territory in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina by force and violence, the national emergency declared on
May 30, 1992, and the measures adopted pursuant thereto to deal with
that emergency, must continue in effect beyond May 30, 1993.
Exec. Order No. 12,831, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,253 (1993), reprinted in Nash, supra, at 614.
Two communiques dated on or about May 8, 1993, one from the Government
of the Republic of Serbia and one from the Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) are also relevant. In separate opinions, Judges Lauterpacht, Shahabuddeen,
and Weeramantry addressed both the communiques. See I.C.J. Second Request, supra
note 12, paras. 58-61 (adding a statement by Judge Lauterpacht that they "are of
special cogency" as "declarations against interest" demonstrating governmental "assis-
tance to the Serbs in Bosnia in breach of the Security Council embargo"). In perti-
nent parts, the communiques affirmed such involvement. The communique of the
Republic of Serbia stated that it "has been unreservedly and generously helping" in a
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Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Army forces, and general involve-
ment in the Republic of Croatia.33
Finally, the United Nations has noted the applicability of humanitarian
law. Aspects of relevant humanitarian law found applicable include the
Geneva Conventions and certain general prohibitions thereunder which
are covered in Parts II and II of the Civilian Convention that apply
only when the threshold contained in common Article 2 of the Geneva
Conventions has been reached.' The Commission of Experts adds that
"the character and complexity" of what it terms "the armed conflicts,"
alongside the numerous agreements on humanitarian issues, justifies use
of the term "international armed conflicts."35 They also recognize that
classifying the armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina as merely a local
conflict would be seriously misplaced.
The fact that the U.N. Security Council has also recognized the likely
occurrences of "grave breaches" of Geneva law,36 however, should not
be determinative since that phrase is contained within a general section
"just battle." Id. para. 59 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht). The communique of
the Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) noted that it was being "forced
to adjust all future aid ... to reduce it exclusively to essential contingents of food
and medicaments." Id. para. 60. Similarly relevant was a statement on May 11, 1993,
by Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Republic of Serbia. B.B.C. Summary of
World Broadcasts (May 13, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File
(EE11687/Cl) (emphasizing the great deal of assistance sent to Bosnian and
Herzegovina fighters along with aid to Serbs who were at war), quoted in I.C.J. Sec-
ond Request, supra, paras. 58-61 (separate opinions of Judges Shahabuddeen and
Weeramantry).
33. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3118th mtg., at 2, U.N. S.C. Res. 779
(1992) (authorizing the U.N. protection force to aid the Yugoslav army in withdraw-
ing from Croatia).
34. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 808
(1993) (noting the numerous occurrences of Geneva Convention violations among
other international humanitarian laws in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
35. See Commission Report I, supra note 16, at 14 para. 45. The United States,
in its April proposal for the creation of an international criminal tribunal, viewed the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia after June 25, 1991 to be of an international char-
acter with respect to the laws of war, including Geneva law. Marian Nash, Law of
War: Proposed Tribunal for Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 435, 439 (1993).
36. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at 2, U.N. S.C. Res. 808
(1993) (expressing alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international
humanitarian law in Bosnia-Herzegovina); U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.. 3119th mtg., at 1,
U.N. S.C. Res. 780 (1992); U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess. 3118th mtg. at 1, U.N. S.C. Res.
779 (1992); U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3093d mtg., at 3, U.N. S.C. Res. 764 (1992).
CRIMES IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions concerning sanctions for violations of
the Conventions and, thus also, violations of Article 3. The "grave
breaches" sanction provisions in the Civilian Convention relate to acts
committed against "persons ... protected by the present Convention,"37
as opposed to what has been interpreted as a more limited phrase, "pro-
tected persons," found, for example, in Article 27 of Part III of the
Civilian Convention.38 Persons protected under common Article 3 of
the Convention are certainly "persons ... protected by the present Con-
vention."39 This reading of the Civilian Convention is not merely con-
sistent with the ordinary meaning of the language of the treaty consid-
ered in light of its humanitarian object and purpose,' but it is also
37. See Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3, art. 147.
38. See Jordan J. Paust, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident: A Response to
Professor Rubin, 50 OR. L. REV. 138, 143-46 (1971) [hereinafter Paust, My Lai]
(discussing the possible limitations concerning "protected persons" covered under Part
III of the Geneva Civilian Convention).
39. See, e.g., Paust & Blaustein, supra note'8, at 28 n.101 (explaining that any
acts committed against a person constituting a "grave breach" under the Geneva Civil-
ian Convention equally fall under the scope of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention);
see also PlcraT, supra note 27, at 591 (citing common Article 3 in connection with
discussion of the general section on criminal sanctions).
40. Nothing in the text of the Geneva Civilian Convention states that grave
breaches of Article 3 are excluded from Article 147. The text of Article 147 reaches
"persons . . . protected by the present Convention," and thus those protected by Arti-
cle 3 of the Convention. See Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3, 147.
Moreover, Article 147 does not attempt to classify persons or to address from which
parts of the Geneva Civilian Convention persons are protected. Id. The purpose of the
general sanctions section is to assure that infractions of the Geneva Civilian Conven-
tion are punished, especially "grave" breaches or infractions classified according to the
gravity of conduct, outcomes or effects, regardless of the nationality of offenders or
victims, or the place where offenses have been committed. PICTEr, supra note 27, at
587, 597, 602 (noting also that the universal jurisdiction allowed for grave breaches
evidences the intent to punish such conduct); Paust, No U.S. Sanctuary, supra note
14, at 340. Further, a treaty must be interpreted "in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its
object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art.
31(l); see also Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to
the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8 (Mar. 3) (emphasizing use of
"relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they
occur"). Both the ordinary meaning of the text and the purpose of Article 147 of the
Geneva Civilian Convention compel recognition that grave breaches of Article 3 are
included.
Moreover, there is no specific denial of the customary rule that every violation
of the law of war is a war crime, subject to criminal sanctions and relevant state
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especially compelling in view of such a purpose and the now customary
obligation of states to seek out, arrest, and initiate prosecution of or
extradite all persons reasonably accused of having committed war
crimes.4' In terms of subsequent opinio juris, the U.N. International
Law Commission's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind included among "exceptionally serious war crimes"
many of those covered in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
and expressly recognized that its criminal sanctions provisions reached
circumstances of "non-international armed conflicts covered by Article 3
common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions."'42
Another technical point concerns protective coverage under the Civil-
ian Convention when common Article 2 applies. The protections under
common Article 3 are considered to be a minimum set of standards.43
Given the broad scope of the protections', it will encompass many of the
alleged crimes. Without the broad nature of the protections, Article 4
would limit general protection under Part III of the Civilian Convention
to those "in the hands of a Party to the conflict . . . of which they are
not nationals."' In this situation, Bosnian-Serbs and Muslims may con-
obligations. LAND WARFARE, supra note 26, at 178 par. 499, 181 para 506(b). A
violation of Article 3 is a violation of the law of war and a war crime. Id. Custom-
ary international law is a presumptive background for the interpretation of any treaty.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 31(3)(c). It would,
therefore, be improper to deny application of Article 147 to infractions of Article 3.
Yet, in view of such customary law, it would not matter ultimately whether Geneva
law reflects customary obligations to initiate prosecution or extradite those reasonably
accused of criminal activity in violation of common Article 3 because such obliga-
tions pertain under customary international law with respect to any violation of the
law of war. See LAND WARFARE, supra. The United States has domestic legislation
which allows compliance by prosecuting in federal courts or military tribunals. Paust,
No U.S. Sanctuary, supra note 14, at 343-44. Victims may also institute civil claims
in the United States. Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II v. Karadzic, Nos. 93 Civ. 1163
(PKL), 93 Civ. 0878 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Infra note 43.
41. See LAND WARFARE, supra note 26, at 181 para. 506(b).
42. Draft Articles on the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind (I.L.C. first reading, 1991), art. 22(2)(a), at 50, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 238-50, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991) [hereinafter Draft Code] (listing
over twelve specific criminal acts considered to be exceptionally serious international
crimes).
43. See Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and
Hostage-Taking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351, 357 & n.27 (1991) [hereinafter Paust, Suing
Saddam]. They are also recognizably customary. The nature of most portions of the
Geneva Conventions are now viewed as customary law. Id. at 369-70 & n.90.
44. See Paust, My Lai, supra note 38, at 143-46.
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stitute different "nations" even though they exist within a territorial
state. Nonetheless, it would not be policy-serving to apply unrealistic
standards of "national" nexus which function in such a way as to deny
humanitarian protection. The provisions of Part II of the Civilian Con-
vention find greater application by covering the entire population of
each country involved,4' even against a population's own govern-
ment.46 It further includes all individuals exposed to grave danger of
whatever nature in war.' Thus, Part II of the Civilian Convention, like
common Article 3, protects persons regardless of nationality or any other
link between victims and perpetrators.
The threshold for applicability of the crime of "aggression" or rele-
vant Crimes Against Peace is reached at the commencement of a war,
or just prior to a war, as in the case of planning a war of aggression.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg48 recognized such a
situation. Recently, however, the threshold appears to have been low-
ered. For example, the language of the U.N. General Assembly's 1974
Declaration on Aggression49 assumes a more broad-based approach to-
wards a state's use of armed force in contravention of the U.N. Char-
ter,5" the "sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
45. See Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3, art. 4 (finding the provisions
of Part II defined in Article 13). The provisions of Part II cover the whole of the
populations of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in
particular. on race, nationality, religion or political opinion, and are intended to allevi-
ate the suffering caused by war. Id.
46. See Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3, art. 13; Picr=T, supra note
27, at 50, 118-19; Paust, My Lai, supra note 38, at 145-46.
47. See Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3, art. 16; Paust, My Lai, supra
note 38, at 147-49 (setting forth the categories of persons protected under Art. 16,
Part II). These categories are: 1) people exposed to great danger; 2) the wounded,
sick and infirm; 3) expectant mothers; 4) people who have been shipwrecked; 5)
orphans and children separated from their families under the age of 15; and 6) mem-
bers of hospital staffs. Id.; Paust, Suing Saddam, supra note 43, at 356-57.
48. See Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, Oct. 1, 1946; see also U.N. I.L.C., Principles of the Nuremberg Charter
and Judgment, VI(a), G.A. Res. 488, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11-14
para. 99, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
49. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc.
A19631 (1975) [hereinafter 1974 Declaration on Aggression]. The ICJ used the 1974
Declaration on Aggression as evidence of customary law. See Case Concerning Mili-
tary and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua ,v. United
States), 1986 I.C.J. 14 para. 195 (June 27) (tracing the origins of the definition of
aggression to customary international law, under which the sending of armed bands
into the territory of another state is also classified as an armed attack).
50. 1974 Declaration on Aggression, supra note 49, Annex, art. 2. See also RE-
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[or] irregulars . . . which carry out acts of armed force against another
State" of a certain "gravity" or, a curious phrase, "its substantial in-
volvement therein,"'" and "the use of armed force by a State . .. in
any other manner inconsistent with the [U.N.] Charter."52 Also, the
U.N. International Law Commission's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes5
3
retains these recognitions relevant to opinio juris, and thus each provides
factors or circumstances for the lowering of such a threshold.
The U.N. Security Council recognizes the existence of armed conflict
in the region, is concerned with threats to the territorial integrity of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and has declared that as a State
Member of the United Nations, Bosnia-Herzegovina enjoys the rights
provided for in the U.N. Charter.' The Security Council also reaf-
STATEMENT, supra note 11, § 102 cmt. k, reporters' note 6 (stating that it is "gener-
ally accepted that the principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of
force ... have the character of jus cogens"); I.C.J. Second Request, supra note 12,
(separate opinion of Judge Kreca, dissenting, noting "the prohibition of interven-
tion ... is, by its nature, jus cogens").
51. 1974 Declaration on Aggression, supra note 49, art. 3(g).
52. 1974 Declaration on Aggression, supra note 49, art. 1.
53. Draft Code, supra note 42, art. 15, at 30-32 (defining aggression and classi-
fying it as a crime against the peace and security of mankind).
54. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 787 (1992). See
also U.N. SCOR., 48th Sess., 3269th mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 859 (1993), ad-
dressed in I.C.J. Second Request, supra note 12, para. 55 (order and separate opinion
of Judge Bola Ajibola); G.A. Res. 47/121 (1992). Such rights, of course, include the
"inherent right" of self-defense and self-defense assistance affirmed in Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter. See also Paust & Blaustein, supra note 8, at 11 n.39 (concerning
self-defense and self-determination assistance in the context of genocidal attacks);
Richard Falk, The Decline of Normative Restraint in International Relations, 10 YALE
J. INT'L L. 263, 269 (1985) (permitting outside support for people of Afghanistan);
W. Michael Reisman, Article 2(4); The Use of Force in Contemporary International
Law, 78 PRoc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 74, 79 (1984) (entitling people to receive assis-
tance to exercise their right to self-determination bestowed by the U.N. Charter); Id.
at 93-94 (concurring remarks by Jordan J. Paust that outside assistance to aid in the
exercise of self-determination is proper).
An interrelated issue concerns the duty of all signatories to the now customary
Genocide Convention to take action to prevent genocide during both peace and war-
time. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. I; see also U.N. CHARTER, arts. 55(c),
56 (setting forth the obligation to respect and ensure respect for human rights); Order
of Provisional Measures, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. para. 52(A)(1) (Apr. 8) (requiring Respondent to immedi-
ately take all measures within its power to prevent commission of genocide); U.N.
G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030
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firmed the unlawfulness of any taking of territory by force," and de-
manded the immediate cessation of all forms of interference from out-
side the Republic.
56
Additionally, aggressive use of force "inconsistent with the [U.N.]
Charter" recognizably includes the use of force to engage in politicide
or to deprive a people of their right to self-determination, including so-
called crimes against self-determination; 7 to engage in violations of
basic human rights;58 and, in particular, to engage in genocidal "ethnic
cleansing," including a use of forceful restraint to "cleanse" through a
process of starvation. 9 Genocidal "ethnic cleansing" is prosecutable in
(1973) (obligating nations to cooperate with others with the intent to halt and prevent
crimes against humanity, and furthermore, take necessary measures, both domestic and
international, to achieve that purpose). States cannot deny the victims of ongoing
genocide the assistance needed to prevent and to defend against acts of genocide
without violating that duty. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 702 cmt. d (determining
that a state violates customary law by encouraging genocide or otherwise condoning
it). Also, in view of the fact that the prohibition of genocide and related crimes (such
as complicity in genocide) is customary jus cogens, relevant state obligations, such as
seeking to avoid complicitious involvement in genocide, should remain even in the
face of contrary resolutions of the U.N. Security Council. See supra notes 15, 50
(concerning related U.N. Charter prohibitions of the use of force as jus cogens).
55. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3269th mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 889 (1993); U.N.
S.C. Res. 787 para. 2 (1992). See also U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3200th mtg., at 2,
U.N. S.C. Res. 820 (1993) (nullifying all commitments and statements obtained under
duress, especially those regarding land and property).
56. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3269th mtg., at 1, U.N. S.C. Res. 889 (1993); U.N.
S.C. Res. 787 paras. 3, 5 (1992). See also U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3200th mtg., at
2, U.N. S.C. Res. 820 (1993) (nullifying all commitments and statements obtained un-
der duress, especially those regarding land and property).
57. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2) (equal rights and self-determination), art. 2(4)
(prohibition against certain uses or threats of force); Paust & Blaustein, supra note 8.
at 11 n.39, 18-19, 30 (discussing international guidance concerning proscribed acts of
force and aggression by a government against its own people and permissible forms
of sanction strategy in response to such aggression); Jordan J. Paust, Aggression
Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide and Other Crimes Against
Human Rights, 18 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 283, 286-90, 297-98, 303 (1986)
[hereinafter Paust, Aggression Against Authority].
58. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 55(c), 56; see U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3) (citing the
human rights purpose as one of those referred to in art. 2(4)); Paust, Aggression
Against Authority, supra note 57, at 288-89, 293-94, 303 (discussing the right to self-
determination).
59. See generally Paust, Aggression Against Authority, supra note 57, at 292-94
(noting that acts of genocide may be interconnected with the oppression of members
of national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups, and that this also violates norms con-
cerning the process of authority and self-determination); infra note 62.
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any nation as genocide' and, in time of war or belligerency at least, as
a war crime.6 The same applies with respect to genocidal strategies of
60. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 2; see I.C.J. Second Request, supra
note 12, paras. 69-70, 87, 126 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) (ethnic cleans-
ing and other Serbian acts fit within the category of genocide, and Respondent clearly
agrees that ethnic cleansing is genocide); Commission Report I, supra note 16, at 16
paras. 55-56; 20 para. 72. Paragraph 56 addresses the means used to carry out "eth-
nic cleansing":
murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions,
rape and sexual assault, confinement of civilian population in ghetto
areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian popu-
lation, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and
civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. Those practices con-
stitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to specific war
crimes.
Id. par. 56. See also Paust, Congress and Genocide, supra note 20, at 90-94 (stating
that genocide is a generally recognized crime under international law); G.A. Res. 121,
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/147-149 (1992) (finding that
ethnic cleansing constitutes genocide); U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3rd Sess., 82nd mtg.,
at 184-85 (1948) (citing Mr. Bartos, representative of Yugoslavia, who stated that
genocide is also committed when a group is compelled to leave its home). As an
example of such genocide, Mr. Bartos referred to the instance of a "Nazi disburse-
ment of a Slav majority from a certain part of Yugoslavia in order to establish a
German majority there," forcing Slavs to abandon their homes. Id.; see also supra
note 32.
61. See supra note 40 (stressing that any violation of the law of war is a war
crime). Such a willful strategy also implicates several of the Geneva "grave breach"
provisions. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3, art. 147. On the illegality of
ethnic cleansing, see U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. S.C. Res. 827 (1993) (also dis-
cussing the severity of the war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and the decision to
establish an international tribunal); U.N. SCOR, 3200th mtg., U.N. S.C. Res. 820
(1993) (imposing sanctions); U.N. SCOR, 3199th mtg., U.N. S.C. Res. 819 (1993)
(deciding on the necessity of a mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina to monitor the
human rights situation and report to the U.N. Security Council); U.N. SCOR, 3137th
mtg., U.N. S.C. Res. 787 (1992) (deciding on necessary efforts concerning the situa-
tion in Yugoslavia); U.N. SCOR, 3119th mtg., U.N. S.C. Res. 780 (1992) (requesting
the Secretary General to establish a Commission of Experts to examine evidence and
information on the breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other humanitarian law,
pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 771 and 780); U.N. SCOR, 3106th
mtg., U.N. S.C. Res. 771 (1992) (deciding on the necessity to collect substantial in-
formation on violations of humanitarian law and submit it to the U.N. Security Coun-
cil); Report of the Secretary General, supra note 14, paras. 6, 9, 11, 48 (addressing
crimes against humanity including "ethnic cleansing").
In particular, rape used as a tactic for such purposes is covered by customary
laws of war. See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3(1)(a)-(c), 16,
27 (rape), 31-33, 147; Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 51(2); 75(l)-(2)(a), (b), (d);
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forced starvation.'
76(1); Protocol II, supra note 4, arts. 4, 13(1)-(2); Report of the Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties (listing
war crimes as presented to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference; including Serbia as a
member of the Commission) [hereinafter 1919 Commission Report]: crime no. I (sys-
tematic terrorism); crime no. 5 (rape); crime no. 6 (abduction of women and girls in
order to enslave them in prostitution); crime no. 12 (attempts to denationalize citizens
of an occupied territory); U.N. S.C. Res. 827, Preamble (1993); U.N. S.C. Res. 820
(1993); Commission Report I, supra note 16, para. 56 (describing means by which
ethnic cleansing has been implemented), para. 59 (stating that acts of sexual assault
are prohibited); Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian
Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424 (1993); Jordan J. Paust, Correspondence, 88 AM. J.
INT'L L. 88 (1994); see also Commission Report II, supra note 32, at 13 para. 50(c)
(analyzing the outcome of the strategy by explaining how victims of rape often left
their homes only to settle in refugee camps or be killed). Rape is also used as part
of an ethnic cleansing strategy. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., at 66
para. 24, 108 para. 48, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50 (1993); INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW GROUP, No JUSTICE, No PEACE: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR RAPE AND GEN-
DER-BASED VIOLENCE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 23 (1993).
62. Compare Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 2 with Protocol I, supra
note 4, art. 54; Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 14; 1919 Commission Report, supra
note 61 (listing war crimes: crime no. 4 (concerning the calculated attempt to starve
civilians)); Panel, International Law and Food Crisis, 69 PRoc. AM. J. INT'L L. 50-
51 (1975) (addressing the use of food as a political weapon); see also U.N. S.C. Res.
787 (1992) (condemning as violations of humanitarian law the deliberate impeding of
the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian population); U.N. S.C. Res.
771 (1992) (deciding on the necessity to collect substantial information on such viola-
tions of humanitarian law and to submit it to the U.N. Security Council).
The deliberate attempt to starve Muslim civilians is a stratagem that is geno-
cidal in purpose and effect. It is also a wilful violation of the customary laws of
war. For example, the Responsibilities Commission of the Paris Peace Conference
designated crime no. 4 as "deliberate starvation of civilians." 1919 Commission Re-
port, supra note 61. Moreover, deliberate starvation is a "grave breach" of Geneva
law. The duty to protect all persons exposed to grave danger from ill-treatment in-
cludes starvation. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 3. arts. 3, 16. Further du-
ties include the protection against wilful killing. Id. arts. 23, 147; see also Roy
Gutman, Bosnian Talks Threatened by Sarajevo Siege, NEWSDAY, Aug. 2, 1993, at 14
(discussing the blockage of overland food shipments by the Bosnian Croat forces to
the Bosnian interior); Murray Kempton, The UN Shuffles Toward Destiny, NEWSDAY,
May 7, 1993, at 13 (cataloguing the action of the Serbs to include sabotaging water
supplies, blockading the delivery of medicine and food shipments, and using arms
against an unarmed populace); Carol J. Williams, Rescue of Wounded in Bosnia
Aborted. Amid Serb Shelling, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 25, 1993, at 16A (de-
scribing how the Bosnian Serbs blocked convoys of food to Muslim enclaves in east-
em Bosnia); John F. Bums, U.N. Aide Seeks Deal on Stranded Serbs, N.Y. TIMES,
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IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Human rights are often intertwined with the law of armed conflict and
each may inform the other and, in turn, shape and clarify normative
contours and content. Often, issues of human rights emerge in times of
armed conflict and many of the prohibitions in Geneva law reflect basic
human rights. Violations of human rights can result in both prosecutions
of war crimes and "crimes against humanity" (which contain a set of
crimes under customary international law characteristically involving
human rights infractions and which are also informed by both Geneva
and human rights law). Violations of human rights as such, however,
have too infrequently been the direct subject of criminal sanctions. The
most notable instance occurred at the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg and in subsequent Nuremberg proceedings under the heading
"Crimes Against Humanity."'63 More recently, the U.N. International
Mar. 22, 1993, at A6 (controlling passage of food shipments to Srebrenica); Bill
Schiller, Bosnian Aid Mission Failing, Officials Say, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 31, 1992,
at A3 (reporting that Serbian authorities are largely to blame for the failed mission);
John F. Bums. Christmas in Sarajevo: Prayers and Anguish, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
1992, at Al (highlighting the control by Serbian forces over access to food and major
roads across former Yugoslavia); Roy Gutman, No More Escape: Bosnia Waits in
Vain for Outside Help, NEWSDAY, Oct. 26, 1992, at 7 (quoting international relief
agencies to confirm that Croats are blocking all food shipments). The systematic na-
ture of controlling access to food, "ethnic cleansing," and the committing of rape,
were so deliberate, widespread, and frequent that local commanders and even those
outside formal lines of authority did not need direct orders to understand that use of
these strategies was expected and approved. Id. In any event, criminal dereliction of
duty and complicity are necessarily involved.
63. See, e.g., Paust, Aggression Against Authority, supra note 57, at 294 (listing
offenses included among those prosecuted under crimes against humanity). The
Nuremberg Charter invoked customary human rights law when it charged the Nazi
war criminals with committing crimes against humanity. LOuis HENKIN ET AL., IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 986 (2d ed., 1987). The Commission Report further sets forth
offenses against human rights and/or "crimes against humanity." Commission Report I,
supra note 16, paras. 39, 49-50. The precept of crimes against humanity applies to
the conflict, and an act can be both a war crime and a crime against humanity. Id.
paras. 46, 49-50; see also Paust, Aggression Against Authority, supra note 57, at 290-
96 (discussing offenses against human rights, genocide and political oppression as well
as crimes against humanity); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 710 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (using O.A.S.'s recognition that causing "disappearance of individuals" is a
"crime against humanity"); LORD WRIGHT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION 35 (1948) (noting the early state practice of Great Britain,
France and Russia involving condemnation of 1915 massacres as "crimes against hu-
manity"); Commission Report I, supra note 16, at 117 (recognizing the appropriate-
1994] CRIMES IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 519
Law Commission's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes extended recognition of
such offenses to include "systematic" murder or torture, murder or tor-
ture "on a mass scale," and the "forcible transfer" of a population.'
The U.N. International Law Commission appropriately stressed that
offenses against human rights can occur regardless of the status of the
perpetrator, as was the case with Nuremberg. Moreover, head-of-state or
official elite status does not provide immunity,' and "private" actors
have private duties with respect-to human rights law.' In fact, there is
simply no requirement in general human rights instruments that human
rights infractions be perpetrated at the hands of officials, under "color of
law," a curious American phrase, or as a matter of "official policy."'67
ness of criminal sanctions by making all persons who violate the laws and customs of
war and the "laws of humanity" liable to criminal prosecution). A former U.S. Secre-
tary of State wrote that the slave trade constitutes a "crime against humanity." Robert
Lansing, Notes on World Sovereignty, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 13, 25 (1921). Author
George Curtis remnarked that slavery is a "crime against humanity." II ORATIONS AND
ADDRESSES OF GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIs 208 (Charles E. Norton ed., 1894). Yet
another notable author, Frank C. Newman, discussed forms of redress, including crimi-
nal sanctions, that most often assist victims of human rights. Frank C. Newman,
Redress for Gulf War Violations of Human Rights. 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
213, 216-18 (1992). Such early state practice, opinio juris and textwriter opinions are
relevant concerning the recognition of and customary nature of such crimes prior to
Nuremberg. They also demonstrate that crimes against humanity, like genocide (a spe-
cial category thereof), can occur in times of relative peace. It is necessary to punish
crimes against humanity regardless of their nexus to war. Diane Orentlicher, Settling
Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100
YALE L.J. 2537, 2590 (1991).
64. Draft Code, supra note 42, at 44-48, art. 21.
65. Draft Code, supra note 42, at 25-26, art. 13; 46.
66. Draft Code, supra note 42, at 46. The language of a treaty can imply private
duties whereas human rights instruments additionally point to the need to recognize
certain private duties and to further demonstrate contours of private duty. Jordan J.
Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARv.
HUM. RTS. J. 51 (1992) [hereinafter Paust, Private Duties); Genocide Convention,
supra note 2, art. 4 (addressing "private individuals"). But see Nigel S. Rodley, Can
Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWEN-
TY-FIRST CENTURY 297, 298 (Kathleen Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds., 1993) (resting
his primary conclusions on a false, positivist and state-oriented view of obligations
and a false notion that human rights claims arose "contemporaneously with the rise of
positivist doctrines of law and state sovereignty").
67. See Paust, Private Duties, supra note 66 (discussing whether the language of
a treaty implies private duties, or whether human rights instruments recognize certain
private duties and demonstrate "additional contours of private duties"). Cf. Commission
Report I, supra note 16, para. 49 (focusing on "official policy").
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There is no logical reason why both criminal and civil sanctions against
private perpetrators of human rights infractions are not more broadly
applied. Similarly, in human rights instruments, there is no limitation of
available sanctions to civil remedies.
Finally, international penalties recognized in a new international code
or in a statute for a new international tribunal could merely mirror any
relevant domestic law penalties as well as penalties evident in the cus-
tomary practice of nations. Those who attempt to invoke nulla poena
sine lege, or sine crimen, arguments that were rightly denounced at
Nuremberg could thereby be estopped from doing so." As recognized
at Nuremberg, penalties might simply include any of the sanctions al-
lowed under customary international law as evidenced by opinio juris
and the practice of nations. In cases of war crimes, penalties have
ranged from letters of reprimand to death. The long history of such
practice forms the basis for criminal69 or civil sanctions." There is al-
68. See International Military Tribunal, supra note 48, at 218-19, 248-49 (Hague
Convention IV binding on German nationals as customary international law despite
Germany's failure to ratify it). The customary range of criminal penalties applies even
though the convention contains no enumeration of general penalties, no expression of
criminal sanctions as such, and makes no differentiation between criminal or civil
sanctions. Id. The International Tribunal can impose any penalty of imprisonment, but
cannot impose the death penalty, and can consider typical sentences "applicable in the
courts of the former Yugoslavia." Report of the Secretary General, supra note 14,
paras. 111-15.
69. See Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Respon-
sibility, 57 Min. L. REv. 99, 113-18, 122, 130-31, 169, 184-85 (1972) [hereinafter
Paust, Norms, Myths] (discussing from the historical perspective the American commit-
ment to the international law of war, actual cases and sanctions); U.S. DEP'T OF AR-
MY, PAMPHLET 27-161-2, II INTERNATIONAL LAW 221-22, 226-35 (1962); LAND WAR-
FARE, supra note 26, at 182 para. 508 (addressing penal sanctions and requiring pun-
ishment for violations of the law of war to be proportionate to the gravity of the
offense). See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFt INTERNATIONAL LAW
CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
105-08, 225 (1987) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, DRAFT ILC CODE AND TRIBUNAL]; M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW-A DRAFr INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CODE 160-62 (1980) (also noting the differences of penalty and sanctions
between the Draft International Criminal Code and the draft statute for an interna-
tional criminal tribunal). Under international law and relevant U.S. domestic law,
international crimes do not have to be defined with great precision. Id. See, e.g., Ex
pare Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1942); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
153, 162 (1820).
70. See, e.g., Paust, Suing Saddam, supra note 43, at 360-71, 378 (analyzing the
"right to an effective remedy" and its applicability in domestic U.S. litigation); Jordan
J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Rights Precepts in U.S. History and
520 [VOL. 9:2
1994] CRIMES IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
so a well-recognized customary international law concerning leadership
or command responsibility for war crimes,7' complicity,72 and the
question of superior orders,.3 which together can form the general basis
for recognizable criminal responsibility. 4
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there are several types of international criminal laws
applicable to the events in, the former Yugoslavia. Hopefully, the Inter-
national Tribunal will aid in the enforcement of some or all of these
laws in the near future, and a permanent International Criminal Tribunal
will be established to supplement enforcement of international criminal
law. 5 Customary international law of a peremptory nature already
the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 611-
28, 640-41 (1989) (discussing the customary human right to an effective remedy for'
human rights infractions). More generally, every violation of "an engagement involves
an obligation to make reparation." Factory at Chorzow, Claim for Indemnity (Germany
v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, at 29 (Sept. 13).
71. See generally Hays Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL.
L. REV. 1 (1973); Paust, Norms, Myths, supra note 69, at 175-84 (pointing out the
limits of leader responsibility); Jordan J. Paust, Superior Orders and Command Re-
sponsibility, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT 73, 78-88 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 1987); see also O'Brien, supra note 32, at 649, 651-53.
72. Paust, Norms, Myths, supra note 69, at 166-69.
73. Paust, Norms, Myths, supra note 69, at 170-75; BASSiOUNI, DRAFT ILC CODE
AND TRIBUNAL, supra note 69. at 74-78; YORAM DINSTEN, THE DEFENSE OF 'OBEDI-
ENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS' IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1965); LESLIE C. GREEN, SUPE-
RIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1976).
74. Draft Code, supra note 42, at 5-8, 22-25, arts. 3, 11-12.
75. See U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., U.N. S.C. Res. 808 (1993) (contemplating the
establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute violators of international human-
itarian law); see also Revised Report of the Working Group on the Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court, I.L.C., 45th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/L.490 & Add. 1
(1993); M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI, DRAFT ILC CODE AND TRIBUNAL. supra note 69;
BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT-A STEP TOWARD
WORLD PEACE (1980); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International
Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1991); M. Cherif Bassiouni &
Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New
International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L" L. 151 (1992) (positing that the
establishment of an international criminal court would provide an effective method of
resolving international problems); Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal
Code and Court: Where They Stand and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 375 (1992) (contemplating the future direction of the international
criminal code and court).
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places an obligation on each nation-state to search for and bring into
custody, and to initiate prosecution of or to extradite all persons within
its territory or control who are reasonably accused of having committed,
for example, war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, breaches of
neutrality, and other crimes against peace.76 Thus, each state will retain
such responsibility regardless of the existence of the International Tribu-
nal, or whether the particular accused are indicted before such a court or
the tribunal.77
Once again there is genocide occurring in Europe. Affirmative steps
must be made this time to stop such crimes and to punish those who
76. See Paust, No U.S. Sanctuary, supra note 14, at 337-41 (discussing the obli-
gations of states to enforce criminal sanction provisions).
77. The International Tribunal was created by U.N. Security Council Resolution
827 on May 25, '1993, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 808 on Feb. 22. 1993.
See Peter H.F. Bekker, Election of Judges of the International Tribunal for Violations
of Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 668 (1993) (list-
ing the names of the eleven judges of the International Tribunal who were elected on
Sept. 17, 1993). The Report of the Secretary General recognizes the existence of
"concurrent jurisdiction of the International Tribunal and national courts," but also
points out a "primacy" for that of the International Tribunal. Report of the Secretary
General, supra note 14, paras. 64-68 (adopted by U.N. S.C. Res. 827 (1993)). Thus,
each state retains the general responsibility to initiate prosecution of, or to extradite
those reasonably accused. Once an accused has been "tried" by the International Tri-
bunal, however, that individual cannot be "tried" again for the same acts "before a
national court." Id. paras. 66, 68 (Article 10(1)). Such a scheme "shall be carried out
without prejudice to the right of the victims to seek, through appropriate means, com-
pensation for damages incurred as a result of violations of international humanitarian
law." Id. para. 7 (1993). Thus, state responsibilities concerning the right of victims to
civil remedies remain. See, e.g., Paust, Suing Saddam, supra note 43, at 360-71, 378-
79 (discussing the availability of remedies for violations of the law of war). State
responsibilities with respect to the International Tribunal are binding under Article 25
of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary General, supra, paras. 64-68
(deciding that the International Tribunal will carry out its work without prejudice to
the right of victims to seek compensation for damages due to the violations of inter-
national law); Id. paras. 22-23, 28. Under Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, these spe-
cial responsibilities supersede more ordinary treaty obligations. See QUESTION OF IN-
TERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION ARISING
FROM THE AERIAL INCIDENT AT LOCKERBIE, 1992 I.C.J. 15 para. 39 (Apr. 14). They
should not, however, supersede customary jus cogens. See supra note 15.
Germany is fulfilling its responsibility by prosecuting a person reasonably ac-
cused of international crimes. See, e.g., Stephen Kinzer. Germans Arrest Serb as
Balkan War Criminal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1994, at A4. Under Article 9, paragraph
2 of its statute, however, the International Tribunal can request Germany to defer to
its competence, which "shall have primacy." See Report of the Secretary General,
supra, para. 68.
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have committed, planned, .encouraged, condoned, or otherwise participat-








Shape signs of our own sanity?
